Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have cooperated during several years to provide their citizens with an e¢ cient and reliable electricity source. In fact, all of them have reformed their electricity sectors and have today access to a common power market consisting of two parts: (i) bilateral trade of contracts between operators; and (ii) the non-mandatory power exchange, Nord Pool.
Because of these reforms, it is natural to ask whether they have been successful: has the common power market been competitive or have electricity suppliers had market power? Moreover, since there was a stepwise evolution from national markets to a multi-national and largely deregulated power market, we also ask how the degree of market power has evolved during this integration process?
A straightforward measure of a market's competitiveness is the price-marginal cost markup since it is zero at a perfectly competitive market, meaning that the electricity price should equal the production cost of the marginal unit of electricity. However, even though market prices are easily accessible in the Nordic power market, this is not the case with marginal costs and some other method must be used to measure the degree of market power. One such method is a conjectural variation method named the Bresnahan [7] -Lau [19] method. 1 The conjectural variation elasticity at the industry level is the average of the individual …rms'conjectural variation elasticities, which measure the …rms' output response to the single …rm's output change as conjectured by this …rm. Thus, if there is perfect competition, there is no output response since a single …rm cannot a¤ect output at the industry level, whereas the response is one-toone if there is no competition since the industry behaves as a single …rm.
The conjectural variation elasticity is estimated from a two-equation system, where the …rst equation is electricity demand as a function of electricity price and at least one exogenous variable, whereas the second equation is electricity supply, derived from pro…t maximization, which is electricity price as a function of industry output, the same exogenous variables as in electricity demand and maybe some other exogenous variables.
The exogenous variables are introduced to solve an identi…cation problem. Bresnahan [7] solved this problem by using a rotation variable in the demand equation, whereas Lau [19] showed that the identi…cation of market power is possible as long as demand is non-separable in at least one exogenous variable. Thus, if at least one exogenous variable is part of an interaction term in the demand equation, the identi…cation problem is solved since the interaction term acts as a rotation variable and it is also non-separable in the exogenous variable. 2 Hjalmarsson [15] and Vassilopoulos [24] are the only studies that we are aware of that measure the degree of market power in the Nord Pool area, and they …nd that the power market has been competitive. However, none of them studies the e¤ect of market expansion on the degree of market power, meaning that the present paper …lls a gap in the literature. 1 Examples of studies that use this method, or some variant of it, include Aiginger et al. [1] , Alexander [2] , Azzam and Park [6] , Böckem [8], Hyde and Perlo¤ [16] , and Sha¤er [21] . 2 The Bresnahan-Lau method has been criticized by Corts [10] , who shows that the estimated conjectural variation elasticity measures the marginal, and not the average, collusive behavior in an industry. However, by using direct measures of marginal costs to calculate the 'true' value of the conduct parameter, Clay and Troesken [9] and Genesove and Mullin [13] show that the method preforms well when the degree of market power is not too high. Thus, since Nord Pool consists of over 100 …rms, the method is appropriate to use. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w The rest of this paper is outlined as follows: The Bresnahan-Lau method or model is presented in Section 2, Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion.
2 The Bresnahan-Lau model
The static model
The Bresnahan-Lau model is a static model since there are no lagged or lead values of the variables included. Speci…cally, the electricity demand function is
where Q is quantity demanded, P is price of power, Z is a vector of exogenous variables, is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and " is a random term. Moreover, the electricity supply relation is
where W is a vector of exogenous variables, is a vector of parameters to be estimated, is the degree of market power, and is a random term. c ( ) in (2) is the marginal cost of producing electricity, meaning that when = 0, the price of power is equal to the marginal cost and we have a perfectly competitive power market since all suppliers of electricity are price-takers. However, when suppliers are price-setters, the marginal revenue as perceived by the single supplier is equal to the marginal cost, and this is because P + h ( ) is the marginal revenue at the industry level and is the perceived percentage of this revenue. Thus, when = 1, we have a perfect cartel in the power market.
Then, by assuming a linear demand function for electricity,
including an interaction term between P and Z that acts as a rotation variable, and a linear marginal cost function,
the electricity supply relation is
Thus, if we …rst estimate (3), meaning that we can calculate Q , we can identify the degree of market power, , after having estimated (5).
The dynamic model
Steen and Salvanes [23] argue that a dynamic reformulation of the BresnahanLau model into an error-correcting framework is necessary for two reasons. The …rst reason is that this framework allows for short-run deviations from long-run 3 
P Z;0 P Z t + P Z;1 P Z t 1 + Q;1 Q t 1 + " t ;
and continue by writing the electricity supply relation as an autoregressive distributed lag model:
where the long-run stationary equilibrium is found by setting
we relax the restriction of one lag and include an intercept term, (6)- (7) can be written in error-correcting forms:
and
See Steen and Salvanes [23] for a derivation and a discussion of the relationship between the distributed lag model and its error-correcting form.
3 Empirical analysis
Data set
The data set consists of weekly data from all Nord Pool participants, covering the period from week 1 in 1996 to week 16 in 2004. See Table 1 for the dates in the integration process, and Table 2 for the variables used, their de…nitions and data sources.
[ Tables 1-2 The price variable is Nord Pool's spot price at the system level (P ). Further, since the industry sector is the largest consumer of electricity, we include industrial production (Prod ) when studying electricity demand. A problem, however, is that data are available only on a monthly basis, whereas all other variables are available on a weekly basis. There are two options at hand: (i) to exclude this variable (Vassilopoulos [24] ); or (ii) to interpolate data into weekly estimates (Hjalmarsson [15] ). We choose to interpolate since the variation of this important variable within each month is expected to be small. Two other variables a¤ecting electricity demand are the temperature (Temp), which is a proxy for the amount of electricity needed for heating, and the length of a day (Daylength), which is a proxy for the amount of electricity needed for lightning. We also need at least one interaction variable to be able to identify the degree of market power. For this reason, we let the spot price at the system level to interact with the temperature as well as the length of a day in the Nord Pool area (P*Temp and P*Daylength).
To determine electricity supply, we need to approximate the marginal cost function and also …nd variables that shift this function. For this reason, we look at the opportunity cost of hydro generation, and two factors that a¤ect this cost are in ‡ow of water to reservoirs (In ‡ow ) and how full they already are. We choose the in ‡ow variable as a shift variable.
The Nordic power market consists of a relatively large amount of hydro generation, which is a cheap electricity source and has almost no variable costs (Andersson and Bergman [5] ), meaning that hydro power is a base load electricity. When more energy is needed, more expensive sources such as thermal power are used, and this residual electricity is produced with a number of inputs such as bio fuel, coal, gas, and oil.
Contrary to hydro power, the technology of residual electricity has higher and more variable costs (Green and Newbery [14] ). Therefore, we incorporate the coal price (Coal ) and the Brent crude oil price (Oil ) into electricity supply to account for the thermal part of electricity generation. Moreover, to account for the residual electricity trend, we include residual electricity in relation to total electricity production (Resel ) as a variable in the analysis.
Finally, the increase in electricity traded at Nord Pool's spot market is an exogenous trend that need to be taken into consideration when building the empirical model. Following Hjalmarsson [15] , this is accomplished by regressing the system turnover (Turnover ) on the market share (Market share) and, thereafter, use the residual as a detrended quantity variable (Q).
See Table 3 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis in the di¤erent subperiods in the integration process.
[ Table 3 about here.]
Statistical tests
Before specifying the two-equation regression model, we need to test if the variables are stationary. If this is not the case, we also need to test for cointegration to ensure the existence of a long-run equilibrium in data. Finally, a separability test is preformed on the interaction variables to make sure that the degree of market power is identi…able (Lao [19] Dickey-Fuller's augmented unit root test is used in companion with the AIC to test if the variables are stationary. However, a potential problem is that the variables are highly seasonal, meaning that we have to deseasonalize data before using the test. This is accomplished by introducing weekly dummy variables and estimate the following equation:
whereŷ t is the regression residual, which is the deseasonalized value of y t . See Table A .1 in the Appendix for results. Thereafter, we use the Johansen [18] approach to search for cointegrated relations between the variables. Speci…cally, we use the Johansen and Juselius [17] multivariate cointegration test, which is a maximum likelihood test on the results from a vector autoregression. As above, a potential problem is that the variables are highly seasonal, meaning that deseasonalized data are used in the tests. See Tables A.2-A.3 in the Appendix for results, which show that we have cointegrated relationships among the integrated variables, both at the demand and supply sides of the power market.
Finally, electricity demand must be non-separable in at least one of the interaction variables, and the appropriate test is an extension of the cointegration test by introducing restrictions that the interaction variables are zero. The restricted model is, thereafter, compared to the unrestricted model using a likelihood ratio test. See Table A .2 in the Appendix for results, which show that the interaction variables should be included in the regression model.
Estimation results
The demand function and the supply relation for electricity are
CVj ;i CV j;t 1 + " t ;
and where fCV g l j=1 are cointegrated vectors. Because of a simultaneity problem that arises in demand and supply models, two-stage least squares is used in the analysis. In (11), the …rst lag of the system price, the temperature, and the in‡ow of water to reservoirs are used as instruments, and in (12), the temperature and the length of a day are used as instruments. Both equations are estimated using autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. First, (11) is estimated for the whole period using …ve lags. Insigni…cant variables are, thereafter, removed from the regression equation and a parsimonious model is derived. See Table A .4 in the Appendix for results for the whole period and for each subperiod in the integration process, which show that lagged quantities have a positive impact on electricity demand. The estimates for the cointegrating vectors show that the current price has a negative impact on electricity demand. Moreover, increased temperature and longer days cause electricity demand to fall.
Second, (12) is estimated including Q = Q Q= P in the regression equation. Since the price variables are non-stationary, an error-correction model is used to estimate electricity supply, and as the error-correction term, we use the …rst lag of the cointegrating vector. Electricity supply is estimated for the whole period, and a parsimonious model is derived as above, which is estimated for each subperiod in the integration process. See Table A .5 in the Appendix for results, which show that the in ‡ow of water to reservoirs has a negative impact on electricity price, while the use of residual electricity has a positive impact on this price. The error-correction term indicates a slow error-correction in line with previous literature (Hjalmarsson [15] and Vassilopoulos [24] ).
Finally, estimates of the degree of market power, , are found in Table 4 . The results show that electricity suppliers have had a small, but statistically signi…cant, degree of market power during the whole period, even though it has been reduced as the market has expanded. In the last subperiod, there was no market power in the Nordic power market. In economic terms, the estimated market powers indicate small markups over marginal costs. In fact, the implied Lerner index gives a markup of less than one percent in the di¤erent subperiods and an even smaller markup for the whole period. 4 
Discussion
The aim of this paper has been to examine how the degree of market power has changed as the Nordic power market has evolved from national markets to a multi-national market. While previous studies have not found any evidence of market power in the Nord Pool area (Hjalmarsson [15] and Vassilopoulos [24] ), our study, which use a more comprehensive data set, indicate that there has been a small, but statistically signi…cant, degree of market power during almost the whole period. More importantly, our results show that the degree of market power has been reduced as the market has expanded. Table 4 . However, since no minus sign is included in the regression equation, changes sign. Therefore, in Table A However, the implied Lerner index gives a markup of less than one percent over marginal cost, meaning that the impact of market power on the electricity price has not been that severe. Steen [22] examined the Norwegian market with results similar to ours and concluded that "the results are probably more a word of warning that we should be careful to allow more concentration in this market". Most likely, there are several reasons why the markup has been low, one of them being the threat of entry.
Wolfram [25] argues that there are two reasons why …rms in the UK have not utilized all potential market power: (i) the threat of market interventions from the authorities; and (ii) the threat of entry into the market. Although her results may not be directly transferable to the Nordic power market, Edin [11] argues that it is possible that the threat of entry has kept the price close to marginal cost also in the Nordic market.
Moreover, Amundsen and Bergman [3] analyze the e¤ect of cross-ownerships in the electricity market and how mergers will a¤ect this market. They conclude that mergers and cross-ownerships may re-establish at least part of the market power that the deregulation has removed.
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